The problem is documented. The market hasn't answered it.

The data critical systems run on is now known to be unreliable — and the gap between knowing that and fixing it is still wide open.

The failures are measurable.

In the first four months of 2025, navigation-signal interference disrupted 122,607 flights over Baltic airspace, according to a report by regional governments to ICAO. In June 2025, more than 1,100 ships in the Gulf had their positions spoofed within 24 hours — vessels placed on land, at airports, and at a nuclear plant. By March 2026, roughly one in fifteen vessels near the Strait of Hormuz still showed falsified positions.

And the interference now comes from orbit.

In 2026, academic researchers traced 75 wide-area jamming events since 2019 to a Russian early-warning satellite in a Molniya orbit — degrading GPS, Galileo, and BeiDou from space, not from a local transmitter. The systems that consume that navigation and timing data have no way to tell a spoofed signal from a real one.

The data is wrong even when nothing is attacking it.

A study of 1,114 vehicles across five manufacturers found real capacity differences of 12–25% within every model — while the onboard state-of-health metric failed to track them. Cells reporting near-identical health can be on completely different failure trajectories, and the ±10% accuracy disclaimers attach to the very figures insurers, regulators, and buyers depend on — figures no one outside the manufacturer can check.

The grader and the graded are the same party.

Across most critical systems, the entity that reports a system's health is the same entity accountable when that health is disputed. There is no independent layer between the claim and the people who rely on it.

And nothing on the market sits at the boundary.

Monitoring tools watch data after it's inside. Dashboards display it. Consultants audit it after the fact. None verify it at the point it enters the decision — the one place a wrong number can still be stopped before it acts. That layer doesn't exist yet.

That is the layer Traceful builds.

Sources: regional governments' report to ICAO, via SVT (2025); Windward / FocalPoint Positioning (2025); Clements, Kriezis & Humphreys, arXiv:2606.03673 (2026); battery state-of-health validation study, arXiv:2603.21592 (2026). Full citations available on request.